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Abstract 
Why has the completion of the single market in financial services proved so difficult 
and time consuming? This paper addresses this question by applying a revised version 
of the ‘advocacy coalition framework’, modified so as to incorporate the role of 
material interests as well as ideas, to the empirical record of the policy-making 
processes of key pieces of legislation dealing with securities trading in the EU.
It is argued that in almost all the Lamfalussy directives, the main (but, by no means, 
the only) line of division was between a ‘Northern European’ coalition and a 
‘Southern European’ one. This was due to differences in the national regulatory 
frameworks, the configuration of national financial systems and their competitiveness 
(hence, ‘interests’). However, the tension was also due to different belief systems 
(hence, ‘ideas’) about financial services regulation.  
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2Introduction
More than half a century after the signing of the Treaty of Rome and the re-launch of 
the single market programme in the mid 1980s to be completed in 1992, financial
market integration was far from being achieved in the European Union (EU) in the 
early 21 century (for an overview of financial market integration in Europe since the 
1960s see Story and Walter 1997, Maes 2007; other literature focusing on the 1980s 
and the early 1990s is reviewed in Section 2). Moreover, as elaborated in this paper, 
several financial directives negotiated throughout the 2000s proved to be as politically 
controversial as the previous sets of directives agreed in the mid 1980s and early 
1990s. This is puzzling. Why has the completion of the single market in financial 
services proved so difficult and time consuming? Can any lessons be drawn for the 
completion of the single market in other sectors?
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and the introduction of the single 
currency in 1999 gave new momentum to financial market integration in the EU. 
Compared to banking and insurance, securities is the sector of most intense activity in 
the 2000s, partly because market integration had lagged behind in this field (Story and 
Walter 1997) and a period of catch-up was therefore overdue, and partly because 
technical innovations increased the potential for cross-border securities trading
(Underhill 1997). Moreover, unlike the banking sector, where international rules, such 
as the Basel II Accord, are well developed due to the activity of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (Wood 2005), securities markets are subject to limited 
international regulation. Hence, EU regulatory activity in the securities sector was all 
the more necessary.
3Most of the 42 measures proposed in the FSAP for completing the single market in 
financial services concerned securities trading, and they subsequently found their way 
into four so-called ‘Lamfalussy directives’, named after the process through which 
they were negotiated and implemented (on the Lamfalussy architecture see 
Committee of Wise Men 2001, Mügge 2006, Quaglia 2007). These directives were: 
the Prospectus directive (2003), the Market Abuse directive (2003), the Transparency 
directive (2004) and the Market in Financial Instruments directive (MiFID) (2004). 
This paper analyses the policy-making processes of two key pieces of legislation 
necessary for the completion of the single market in securities: the Prospectus 
directive (2003) and the Market in Financial Instruments directive (MiFID) (2004). 
Out of the four Lamfalussy directives, these were those with the greatest economic 
impact and the most politically controversial. This work does not examine the so-
called level 2 implementing measures of these directives (on the difference between 
level 1 and level 2 legislation see Committee of Wise Men 2001).
As pointed out in Section 2 that reviews the literature on the politics of financial 
market integration in the EU, existing explanations have so far focused on one set of 
actors - the Commission, the member states, industry, mainly transnational companies
- highlighting the importance of economic interests in shaping financial services 
regulation. This research takes a different theoretical approach, using a revised 
version of the ‘advocacy coalition framework’ (Sabatier 1998), modified so as to 
incorporate the role of material interests as well as ideas, as elaborated in Section 3. 
4It is argued that in the making of these directives, the main (but, by no means, the 
only) line of division was between a ‘Northern European’ coalition (hereafter referred 
to as ‘Northern coalition’) and a ‘Southern European’ one (hereafter referred to as 
‘Southern coalition’). This was due to differences in the national regulatory 
frameworks, the configuration of national financial systems and their competitiveness 
(hence, ‘interests’). However, the tension was also due to different ‘belief systems’
(hence, ‘ideas’) about financial services regulation. Basically, there was a ‘market-
making’, ‘principle-based’ approach, exposed by policy-makers and stakeholders in 
the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries; and a ‘market-
shaping’, ‘rule-based’ approach of continental Europe (France, Belgium and the 
Mediterranean countries) with Germany in-between due to the presence of competing 
advocacy coalitions domestically. 
These competing belief systems concerning financial services regulation proved to be 
one of the main hindrances to be overcome in the making of an integrated market in 
securities. The rules set in place for the completion of the single market in the early 
2000s were the result of negotiations between these two coalitions, and were based on 
a series of compromises, even though the new rules tended to be closer to the 
preferences of the Northern coalition. This outcome is explained by the bargaining 
power of its members, which in turn was affected by the changes in the policy 
environment and some learning that took place across coalitions.
This paper makes two main contributions to the scholarly literature on the completion 
of single market and to the political economy literature more broadly. It teases out and 
elaborates the belief systems of policy makers and examines the composition of and 
5the interaction between two main advocacy coalitions shaping the politics of financial 
market regulation in the EU. Second, it argues that the long-standing divide between 
Northern Europe and Southern Europe concerning financial market integration is not 
only due to dissimilar (often competing) economic interests. It is also due to different 
ideas about financial services regulation, even though the ideational distance has been 
reduced over time.
2. State of the art on the politics of financial market integration in the EU
Several different answers have been given by political scientists as to what drives 
financial market integration in the EU. Story and Walter (1997) stressed the 
intergovernmental character of the negotiations concerning financial market 
regulation in the EU in the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. Their work regarded 
financial market integration as the ‘battle of the systems’ (which is part of the title of 
the book), whereby the member states were keen to set EU rules that were in line with 
their domestic regulatory approach and did not create comparative disadvantages or 
adjustment costs to national industry and the public authorities. A similar approach 
was also taken by Underhill (1997), who, like Story and Walter, highlighted how the 
‘triangle’ of the three main financial systems in the EU - the British, the French and 
the German - played out and shaped EU financial regulation in the 1980s and early 
1990s.
A second explanation considers the Commission as the core supranational actor 
pushing through financial market integration (Posner 2005, Jabko 2006). A third 
explanation focuses on the role of the private sector, in particular transnational capital 
6(Van Apeldoorn 2002; Bieling 2003, Mügge 2006; Macartney forthcoming). Other 
scholars have focused on networks of regulators in the EU (Coen and Thatcher 2008; 
De Visscher et al. 2008; Quaglia 2008a), an approach which, however, has limited 
explanatory power in the making of level 1 legislation, even though it is more fruitful 
when applied to level 2 legislation. 
Each of these approaches has some explanatory power concerning certain aspects of 
financial market integration and specific stages of the policy-making process of the 
main pieces of legislation regulating financial services in the EU, as elaborated in 
section 6. For example, they shed light onto the agenda setting of the Commission at 
the pre-legislative and drafting stage; the pace setting of transnational industry in 
calling for financial market integration; the intergovernamental character of the 
decision-making process in the Council, where the battle of the systems and the 
preferences of domestic industry come to the fore; and the committee governance at 
work in the implementation stage. However, what all these explanations have in 
common is that they tend to focus on one set of actors – the member states (to be 
precise, the three main member states), the Commission and transnational industry –
and stress the importance of material economic interests in shaping the political 
conflicts concerning financial market regulation in the EU.
This paper argues that in doing so they have overlooked an important part of the 
explanation: the ‘belief systems’ of policy makers. This research adopts a different 
theoretical approach, using a revised version of the ‘advocacy coalition framework’, 
modified so as to incorporate the role of material interests as well as ideas, as 
elaborated in Section 3. This approach has been chosen to shed light onto the politics 
7of financial market regulation in the EU because it adopts a pluralistic view of the 
policy process and outcome that fits well with the multi-level governance of the EU
(on multi-level governance see Hooghe and Marks 2001, Bache and Flinders 2004). 
In fact, advocacy coalitions consist of public and private actors, situated at different 
levels of governance: national, EU and international (on the use of the advocacy 
coalition framework in EU policy-making see Radaelli 1999, Dudley and Richardson 
1999). Moreover, the advocacy coalition framework offers the possibility of 
considering the role played by non-material factors, such as ideas, in shaping financial 
market integration in the EU.
With specific reference to market regulation, Vogel (1996: 20) highlights the
importance of ideas or ‘regimes orientation’, defined as ‘state actors’ beliefs about the 
proper scope, goals, and methods of government intervention in the economy, and 
about how this intervention affects economic performance’. However, it is not only 
state actors that are involved in this process, it also affects private actors (industry). 
Hancher and Moran (1989: 4) use the broader expression of regulatory ‘culture’ about 
‘the rules of the regulatory game’: that is the ‘purpose of regulation’, ‘legitimate 
participants and their relations with each other’. Such culture tends to be context 
specific, as it varies across time, countries and sector (Hancher and Moran 1989). EU 
regulation is an arena where different regulatory approaches come to the fore and 
confront each other, which is why EU regulation is often a ‘patchwork’ of national 
regulatory styles (Heritier 1996: 149).
3. The advocacy coalition framework in theory and practice
8An advocacy coalition is formed by ‘actors from various governmental and private 
organizations who both (a) share a set of normative and causal beliefs and (b) engage 
in a nontrivial degree of co-ordinated activity over time’ (Sabatier 1998: 103). One or 
more coalitions can be present within a policy subsystem, which is composed by a set 
of policy-makers and stakeholders who are actively concerned with a certain issue, 
regularly seeking to influence public policy related to it. As Sabatier (1998: 103) 
specifies, ‘the belief system’ of an advocacy coalition is organised into a ‘hierarchical, 
tripartite structure’: i) the ‘deep core’ of the shared belief system includes basic 
ontological and normative beliefs; ii) the ‘policy core’ beliefs, which represent the 
causal perceptions by the coalition (the definition of the problem, its causes and 
solutions) and are its fundamental ‘glue’; and iii) the secondary aspects of the 
coalition’s belief system, comprising instrumental considerations on how to 
implement the policy core (e.g. minor decisions concerning budgetary allocations, 
administrative regulations) (Surel 2000), and which can vary somewhat among 
different members. 
An important issue that needs to be discussed with reference to this theoretical 
approach is the role of interests as opposed to - or distinct from - ideas and values. As 
originally elaborated, advocacy coalitions are primarily value-based coalitions 
(Dudley and Richardson 1999). Members of the coalitions are assumed to be 
instrumentally rational, following the course of action that is more likely to achieve 
the objectives determined by their cognitive and normative beliefs (Sabatier 1998: 
109). Yet, some authors point out that ideas and interests are ‘not separate entities, 
only analytically separable ones’ (Jacobsen 1995: 309, see also Dudley and 
Richardson 1999), especially in the economic field. Economic ideas matter because 
9they are ‘clusters of ideas/interests’ (Jacobsen 1995: 309) that help actors to define 
their objectives. 
In many policy-oriented studies and empirically grounded research, especially in the 
economic field, it is difficult to neatly separate ideas and interests and it can be 
somewhat naïve to identify coalitions based purely on values or ideas. At the same 
time, as this paper argues, to identify coalitions based purely on interests might 
overlook an important part of the explanation. On the one hand, there are massive and 
powerful economic interests at stake in financial services. On the other hand, ideas in 
the form of technical knowledge (Radaelli 1995, 1999) and policy paradigms (Hall 
1993)1 are important in this complex and ‘technical’ policy area.
Interests can be quite easily incorporated into the advocacy coalition framework, 
which also considers power, in that rival coalitions compete for power in the policy 
subsystem in which they operate. The framework postulates that changes in the policy 
environment - such as changes in socioeconomic and political conditions (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1999) - can trigger a shift the power distribution among coalitions 
and their members (Kuebler 2001). Moreover, Sabatier (1998: 116) acknowledges 
that distributional conflicts are important especially for ‘material groups’, the 
members of which seek to maximise their own material self interest. This type of 
groups represents the vast majority of actors in the financial services subsystem.
                                               
1 A policy paradigm can be defined as a shared body of causal ideas concerning a certain policy area. 
A useful distinction can be made between the most normative part of the paradigm, and ideas about the 
main policy objectives, instruments and strategies (Hall 1993). To a large extent this resembles the 
tripartite division of beliefs used in the advocacy coalition framework, examined below.
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This paper does not test an interest-based explanation versus an idea-based
explanation, feeding into the rationalist - constructivist divide (Checkel 1997, Jupille 
et al. 2003). Instead, it uses the analytical framework of advocacy coalitions, paying 
attention to the belief systems and the interests underpinning those coalitions as well 
as the change of the policy environment in order to shed light onto the complex 
process of the making of the single market in financial services. 
The remainder of this section outlines the two principal advocacy coalitions active in 
the regulation of financial services in the EU, identifies the main members of each 
coalition, and teases out the various components of their belief system. The mapping 
of these coalitions and their belief systems was carried out through more than 40 
semi-structured interviews with policy makers and stakeholders located in several 
member states and EU institutions. The subsequent sections apply the framework to 
the empirical record, highlighting the interplay of the coalitions in the policy process 
and their influence on the outcome. 
The completion of the single market in financial services is characterised by the 
presence of two competing advocacy coalitions: the ‘Northern European’ one, which 
coalesce around the UK, and includes Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxemburg and the 
Scandinavian countries and the ‘Southern European’ one, which coalesce around 
France and Italy, and includes Belgium and the other Mediterranean countries. These 
coalitions espouse two belief systems, which also affect the perceptions of interests of 
their members and vice versa. In other words, the belief systems of the coalitions play 
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a role in shaping their understanding of the context in which they are situated 
(constraints and opportunities).
The ‘deep core’ of the shared belief system of each coalition includes basic 
ontological and normative beliefs about the market, which can be summarised as 
‘market trust’ for the Northern coalition and ‘market distrust’ for the Southern one. 
The ‘policy core’ beliefs concern:
(i) the definition of the problem: whereas completing the single market is more or less 
a shared objective for both coalitions (though with a different degree of intensity,
being more important for the Northern group), the Northern coalition prioritises
market liberalisation, mainly through market-making measures that define conditions 
for market access and operation, stimulating competition and market efficiency (cf 
Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999). The Southern coalition prioritises re-regulation at the EU 
level, through market-shaping measures that pursue policy objectives other than 
market liberalisation, such as consumer protection and financial stability, with a view 
to complement the liberalisation process; 
(ii) the content of regulation: light-touch regulation, principle-based, and competition-
friendly is endorsed by the Northern group, whereas prescriptive regulation, rule-
based, prioritising consumer protection is favoured by the Southern one;
(iii) the relationship between the public authorities and industry: the Northern group
believes in private sector governance (cf Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002), based on the 
involvement of industry through consultation, drafting and implementing soft law; the 
Southern group believes in the steering action of the public authorities, to be kept at 
arm’s length from the private sector. 
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The secondary aspects of the coalition’s belief system vary somewhat among different 
members. They partly depend on the specific situation in which the various members 
of each coalition find themselves, such as the degree of competitiveness, the market 
share and organisational structure for private actors; the organisational structure and 
institutional prerogatives for public actors. These secondary beliefs are not considered 
in this paper, given the considerable number of policy-makers and stakeholders 
involved. 
4. The Prospectuses directive (2003) 
The Prospectus directive allowed capital to be raised throughout the EU on the basis 
of one set of documents -the prospectus - and gave bond issuers a choice of regulator. 
Pre-existing rules concerning the mutual recognition of prospectuses were largely 
ineffective in practice, as different versions of the prospectus had to be prepared for 
each member state (Deutsche Bank 2002). The directive also gave competence to a 
single authority in the member state to supervise compliance with the provisions. 
The draft directive officially proposed by the Commission in May 2001 was criticised 
by industry, which lamented that the draft had not be subjected to a consultation 
procedure before being formally adopted by the Commission (Financial Times, 7 
September 2001, 16 June 2001, see also EBF et al. 2002). Three main criticisms
articulated by the industry and the public authorities of the Northern European 
member states were subsequently taken on board by the European Parliament (EP), to 
be precise the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the EP (EP 2002). 
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The first issue was the scope of the directive, whereby the Northern coalition, which 
favoured ‘light-regulation’, highlighted the insufficient number of exemptions 
included in the directive (EP 2002). This issue was linked to the definition of 
‘qualified investors’, in that this coalition wanted a broader definition of this type of 
investors, for example including certain private investors (Deutsche Bank 2002). This 
is because less burdensome provisions for the issuer usually applies whenever the 
investor is a ‘qualified investor’, which requires less legal protection, as compared to 
small non-qualified investors. 
The second issue was ‘the home country principle’ to determine the competent 
authority for the approval of the prospectus (EP 2002). The European Commission, 
backed by France, Italy and Spain had initially proposed that all equity and most debt 
issuers could go for approval only to their national regulator, which would thus enjoy 
a sort of monopoly, instead of leaving it to the market, giving issuers the possibility of 
choosing the regulator for approval (Financial Times, 5 November 2002, interview, 
London, 12 May 2007). The Northern coalition wanted the issuers to be given the 
choice of which authority to submit the prospectus to for approval. On the one hand, 
the concern of the Northern coalition was that some regulators – in particular those 
from the Mediterranean countries - might insist on the use of the national market as a 
condition of approval (letter of Christopher Huhne, Member of the European 
Parliament, MEP, and rapporteur of this directive, Financial Times, 5 November 
2002). On the other hand, the concern of Southern regulators and the Commission 
was that the freedom for issuers to choose the regulator from which to seek approval 
might trigger a ‘race to the bottom’, as issuers would shop for easy approvals
(Financial Times, 5 November 2002; interviews, Brussels, 13-14 June 2007). 
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The third issue was the duration of the vetting period (EP 2002), which the Northern
coalition wanted as limited as possible, whereas the Southern coalition wanted to give 
the public authorities more time to evaluate the prospectus. Finally, there were issues 
concerning certain features of the prospectus’ content, cross-border use and updating 
(Deutsche Bank 2002). Moreover, whereas the obligation to publish a prospectus did 
not apply to securities offered only to qualified investors, the Mediterranean countries 
insisted to have detailed information provided for retailers. Basically, the debate was 
between a ‘heavy’ prospectus (detailed and prescriptive) and a ‘light’ prospectus
(principle-based) (interview, London, 12 May 2007).
The EP, which received intense lobbying from industry, and the Northern member 
states asked for significant amendments concerning the points mentioned above in 
first reading in February 2002. The Council was internally divided between the 
Northern group and the Southern one. In August 2002, the Commission presented an 
amended proposal in response to amendments proposed by the EP, some member 
states and industry. Negotiations resumed in the Council and between the Council and 
the EP. In the end, exemptions related to qualified investors were extended to certain 
private investors with relevant expertise and the threshold value for exemptions was 
lowered, as proposed by the EP. A compromise between the position of the EP and 
part of the Council, which was also a compromise between the two coalitions, was 
reached on the duration on of the vetting period, and the competent authorities were 
enabled to grant exemptions from disclosure requirements for some enterprises
(Ferran 2004). Eventually, an agreement based on a package deal between the EP and 
the Council was put together, whereby companies that issued bonds (but not shares) 
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above Euros 1,000 would have a choice of regulator, which would de facto give 
freedom of choice to the vast majority of issuers (Financial Times, 1 July 2003). 
As pointed out in several interviews, besides being a clash of national interests - the 
national governments were keen to set in place rules that were most advantageous for 
their financial centres - it was also a matter of different belief systems, based on 
different deep normative beliefs: market trust and market distrust. As for policy core 
beliefs, the Northern coalition privileged a ‘market-making’ regulatory approach,
based on ‘light-touch’ rules, competition (also amongst supervisory authorities) and 
freedom of choice for industry. The Southern coalition preferred a ‘market-shaping’
regulatory approach, based on prescriptive rules, with emphasis on consumer 
protection and limited choice for industry. 
In Northern Europe and Anglo Saxon countries, the prospectus is considered as an 
information tool, not a consumer protection tool: it is ‘light’ and it is not vetted by 
regulators. In Southern Europe, including France, the prospectus is seen as a 
consumer protection tool: the information in it has to be detailed and is vetted by the 
regulators (interview, London, 12 May 2007). This also highlights different visions of
the role of the public authorities vis a vis the market. The Northern approach stresses 
the ability of the market to regulate itself within the limits sets by light touch 
regulation. The Southern approach stresses the public authorities’ role in steering and 
monitoring the market. 
5. The Markets in Financial Instruments directive (MiFID) (2004)
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The MiFID was a core part of the FSAP, being described by financial press as the 
‘new Big Bang’ in financial services (Financial Times, 26 October 2006). It was 
proposed in November 2002 to update the existing Investment Services directive (ISD) 
issued in 1993, which only applied to a specified number of financial instruments and 
investment services. All the firms previously covered by the Investment Services 
directive are subject to the MiFID but new categories of firm fall within the remit of 
the MiFID, such as investment banks, stock brokers and broker dealers, futures and 
options firms, commodity firms, and portfolio managers. Moreover, retail banks and 
building societies are subject to the MiFID for some parts of their business such as the 
sale of securities, or investment products (Ferran 2004). The directive set common 
rules for securities and derivatives markets, permitting investment firms to operate 
throughout the EU by using a ‘single passport’, which allowed financial firms to 
conduct business across Europe with the approval of their home authorities. 
Investment firms were enabled to process client orders outside regulated markets (first 
and foremost, stock exchanges), which was previously impossible in some member 
states. This was the so called ‘concentration rule’, which had been one of the main 
bones of contention in the negotiations of the ISD in 1993, as it was a priority for 
France and the Southern European countries, which had this rule in place (Coleman 
and Underhill 1998, Underhill 1997). The public authorities in these countries 
believed that the market for securities trading should be carefully regulated and 
monitored, hence their legislation prescribed routing all orders for securities trading 
through regulated markets (stock exchanges) (interviews, Rome, 10-11 December 
2007; Paris 18-19 July 2007; Brussels, 13, 25 June 2007). 
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In so doing, they also protected their national stock exchanges from competition from 
‘multilateral trading facilities’ (i.e. broadly non-exchange trading platforms) and 
‘systematic internalisers’ (i.e. banks or investment firms that systematically execute 
client orders internally on own account, rather than sending them to exchanges). Such 
competition was already in place in some member states, such as the UK. This 
approach is competition friendly, even though it can reduce investor protection if 
adequate pre-trade and post-trade requirements are not set in place (for a debate on 
this issue see the various contributions to the volume edited by Ferrarini and 
Wymeersch 2006). This was the most controversial issue in the negotiations of the 
MiFID.
The second controversial issue, which was related to the first one, was ‘pre-trade
transparency’ that referred to publishing the prices of securities, hence the obligation 
by which investment firms have to reveal to the markets details of client orders. If the 
firms are trading on their own account, they should provide some indication of the 
terms on which they themselves stand ready to buy or sell a specified share (Ferrarini 
and Wymeersch 2006). As pointed out in several interviews, this issue was 
particularly important for the Southern coalition, which wanted clear rules for all the 
market players, including investment banks and financial firms, which are by 
definition ‘non regulated markets’. Oversimplifying only slightly, whereas the 
Northern coalition wanted to keep them by and large ‘unregulated’, opposing pre-
trade transparency requirements, the Southern coalition wanted to impose prescriptive 
rules concerning pre-trade transparency, presented as a tool for investor protection.
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The difficulty was to produce pre-trade transparency requirements which were
workable, because if the obligations were too onerous to comply with, investment 
firms would not compete with exchanges - they would not 'internalise', i.e. execute 
share trades off-exchange (interviews, Frankfurt, 10 and 12 September 2007; London, 
2 April and 20 April 2007; Brussels, 27 June 2007). However, without pre-trade 
transparency obligations, there would not be a levelled playing field between stock 
exchanges and banks (interviews, Brussels, 24 October 2007; 13-14 June and 29 June 
2007; Paris, 19 July 2007).
In November 2002 the Commission presented an official draft of the directive that 
was closer to the positions of the Southern coalition (Ferran 2004). According to the 
Financial Times (19 November 2002), this was due to high political intervention by 
the then President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, who had been lobbied by the 
French and Italian stock exchanges. The draft raised the objection of Northern 
member states, some MEPs and parts of the industry, especially the investment firms 
in the UK as well as investment banks, several of which are US-owned, but based in 
London. 
The Commission’s draft was approved by the Council by Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) after the rather unusual decision of the Italian Presidency to call for a vote, 
rather than continuing negotiations in an attempt to reach a consensus, as it is 
generally common practice. This was despite the dissent of the Northern coalition, 
namely the UK, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Nordic countries, with Germany 
switching position towards the Southern coalition, despite the fact that internalisation 
was practised by many German private banks (Financial Times, 9-11 October 2003, 
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The Banker, 1 November 2003). The presidency was seen as having a vested interest 
in pushing through the proposal as it had been formulated (i.e. limiting internalisation), 
despite the opposition of countries that have a large financial sector (interview, 
Brussels, 14 June 2007). The EP, with the backing of Northern member states, first 
and foremost the UK, managed to have important amendments included in second 
reading (Ciani 2006). 
In the Council, preferences differed widely, ranging from the removal of the relevant 
articles concerning pre trade transparency to extending its provision (Deutsche Bank 
2003). Under an earlier position taken by the ECOFIN Council, stockbrokers would 
have had to publish advance prices for potential trades of over €3 million, which the 
MEPs claimed was too risky (EP 2004). In the end, the principle of pre-trade 
transparency was maintained for firms that are termed ‘systematic internaliser’ for 
‘liquid shares’ and for transactions up to a certain threshold, defined as ‘standard 
market size’¸ meaning that very large trading positions will not have to be divulged. It 
should be noted that the precise definition of these terms was the subject of a heated 
debate during the adoption of the level 2 implementing measures by the so-called 
Lamfalussy committees.
Amongst the member states, the positions and the policy preferences of the German 
authorities are the most difficult to characterise. The position of the German 
government on this issue was unclear and unstable because domestically there were 
competing policy preferences of policy-makers and stakeholders that were part of the 
two advocacy coalitions active at the EU level (for similar dynamics in the 
negotiation of the Capital Requirements directive see Quaglia 2008b, see also 
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Grossman 2006). Whereas the most domestically-oriented part of the banking system 
(namely the savings banks and the cooperatives) shared the policy preferences of the 
Southern group, the large private banks shared the policy preferences of the Northern 
group (interviews, Berlin, 23 April 2008; Frankfurt 10-12 September 2007). The 
federal state structure, the competition amongst ministers and the role of party 
political competition compounded the definition of the German position on this 
directive (interview, Paris, 18 July 2007). This also explains why the Germans 
somewhat switched position, voting against the UK and Luxemburg, when the Italian 
presidency called a vote on MiFID in 2003. 
The EP proved an important channel for industry to articulate its policy preferences
and indeed private financial interests, in particular EU and national peak associations 
and large market players sought intensive interaction with MEPs. Reportedly, the UK 
and Finish MEPs (the two rapporteurs of the directive were British and Finish) were 
very active in promoting a market-making, competition-friendly approach (interview, 
Brussels, 28 March 2007, 13-13 June 2007).
The directive basically pitted two coalitions against each other. This was evident in 
the making of level 1 legislation, but it also surfaced in the adoption of some level 2 
measures, which are not discussed in this paper. On the one side, the national 
governments and industry in continental Europe tried to limit the extent of market 
opening, first resisting the end of the concentration rule and subsequently trying to 
shape the market, imposing detailed pre and post trade transparency rules, with a view 
to protecting national stock exchanges, which feared the competition of the large 
(mainly British-based) investment banks and stock exchanges (Financial Times, 13 
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March 2006; The Economist, 9 September 2006). However, the pre and post trade 
transparency rules also served the purpose of consumer protection, especially for 
small investors. On the other side, the UK financial services industry and the national 
authorities were keen to promote market opening (market-making), ending the 
concentration rule, with minimal transparency requirements, with a view to promote 
competition, gaining unrestricted access to Southern European markets.
6. Explaining the completion of the single market in financial services
In an overall assessment, to what extent is the advocacy coalition framework useful to 
explain the completion of the single market in financial services? Does this shed 
novel light onto the policy process and outcome? To address these questions, it is 
necessary to ask which were the most important actors and why? How did policy-
makers and stakeholders define their policy preferences? And how were such 
preferences pursued in the policy process and with what outcome? 
The Commission was particularly influential at the agenda setting stage, meaning in 
drafting the directives, which however had the support of the national governments.
Following the terminology used in other studies adopting an advocacy coalition 
framework (cf Dudley and Richardson 1999), the Commission was a ‘policy broker’ 
(Sabatier 1998). However, whenever the draft regulation produced by the 
Commission was not in line with the policy preferences of one of the two competing 
coalitions identified, the rules had to be substantially redrafted by the Commission in
second reading. 
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The EP was an important channel through which industry was able to articulate its 
policy preferences, as revealed in several interviews. MEPs were lobbied by and 
actively encouraged interaction with industry, seeking information and expertise (cf 
Bouwen 2004), producing reports and trying to understand the issues. MEPs were 
accessible and willing to listen to business, working across party lines and national 
lines. The European Parliament, and particularly the relevant committee, proved to be
closer to the Northern coalition, exhibiting a market-friendly approach, receptive of
the preferences put forward by the most competitive parts of the financial industry, 
generally located in the UK and to some extent in Germany and France. Since three 
out of four directives in the securities sector were adopted in second reading, the EP 
was able to have many of its proposed amendments incorporated into the final draft, 
albeit many member states also supported those changes. 
The member states (to be precise, the national governments, particularly the Treasury 
and Finance Ministries) were key players at the decision making stage because the 
ECOFIN Council had ultimate decision making power, together with the EP. The 
coalitions of member states varied depending on the directive being negotiated and 
the specific issues dealt with, even though the traditional line of friction was between 
countries, such as the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries
embracing a market-making, competition-friendly, principle-based approach; and the 
market-shaping, rule-based, investor protection approach adopted by France, Italy, 
and the other Mediterranean countries; with Germany switching position - and hence 
coalition - depending on the specific content of the legislation being negotiated.
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The positions of the national governments in the negotiations reflected the preferences 
of powerful domestic groups, especially in those countries, such as the UK, where 
there is traditionally an intense and constructive interaction between the public 
authorities and industry (Josselin 1997, Moran 1991). In some cases, it also reflected 
the preferences of the public authorities, even when they differed from those exposed 
by the national industry, or part if it, in particular in countries, such as Germany, 
which has a federal structure (viz the MiFID and the large private banks). This was 
particularly the case in France and Italy, where there is traditionally a strong steering 
action by the state with limited consultation with the private sector (Josselin 1997, 
Grossman 2005), albeit this has began to change in the last decades or so (interview, 
Paris, 18 July 2007, Brussels, 27 June 2007). 
The large member states, which are also those with the largest financial sector in the 
EU, were the most influential in the Council, followed by some of the old member 
states with a relatively large financial sector, and were followed by the new member 
states that have a smaller financial sector, which also tends to be foreign owned. 
Moreover, the new member states joined the EU in 2004, when the negotiations on 
the Lamflaussy directives were either already ended or close to be completed. It will 
be interesting to see how they position themselves in the future, whether they will 
become part of one of the two existing coalitions, reshaping it, or whether a new 
coalition will emerge. After all, enlargement can be regarded as a considerable change 
of the policy environment, altering the power distribution amongst the members of the 
policy subsystem.
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In lobbying on securities governance in the EU, there was a sort of implicit division of 
competences (cf Greenwood 2003). National associations and individual firms mainly 
interacted with the national authorities, whereas EU level associations interacted with 
EU level authorities (the Commission, the EP) (cf Grossman 2004). However, the 
most active national associations, such as the British Bankers Association or the 
German private banks association (the latter has a well staffed office in Brussels), and 
some international companies, which either have offices in Brussels or use the 
services of lobbying firms based there, also lobbied at the EU level, usually (but by no 
means only) the MEPs and the Commission’s officials of their own nationality. This 
was less the case for other national associations, which have a very limited experience 
of lobbying in Brussels and/or prefer to rely on the action of the national public 
authorities. 
In addition, there were international associations, many of which US-based, but 
having an office in London. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA), the International Capital Market Association (ICMA), formed by the merger 
of the International Primary Market Association and International Securities Market 
Association (formerly known as Association of International Bond Dealers), the Bond 
Market Association (which in 2006 merged with the Securities Industry Association, 
creating the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association), the Future and 
Options Association. These organisations often take joint positions, or similar 
positions expressed individually so as to increase the number of responses to 
consultation.
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Given the economic significance of the issues dealt with, the focal points of 
agreement for the formation of coalitions in the negotiations were generally given by 
overlapping or compatible interests (hence, they were coalitions of ‘interests’) even 
though the prevailing beliefs of policy-makers also played a role. The two competing 
belief systems can be characterised as follows. The Anglo Saxon approach is market-
making, in favour of light-touch, principles-based, competition-friendly regulation, 
even when this implies a trade off with consumer protection. This approach is rooted 
in common law and is based on market trust. The Continental approach is market-
shaping, rules-based and heavily regulated, with emphasis on consumer protection, 
even when this reduces competition. This approach is rooted in the Napoleonic code 
and is based on market distrust. In the governance of financial services, the EU is 
moving towards principle-based regulation, but this creates frictions between the two 
belief systems and the policy-makers and stakeholders subscribing to them.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to clearly separate belief systems (hence, ultimately ideas) 
from the features of the national financial system and regulatory issues related to the 
competitiveness of industry or specific preferences of market players (hence,
interests). British policy-makers have traditionally adopted an internationalised free 
market approach, but this is also influenced by the large number of foreign owned 
companies (especially from the US) located in the City. French, Italian, Spanish 
policy-makers embrace a market-shaping inward-oriented approach, which is 
interconnected to the limited competitiveness of their financial sector. German policy-
makers also subscribe to a market-shaping policy, but given the competitiveness of 
part of their financial sector (private investment banks and financial conglomerates) 
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tend to be more market oriented and competition friendly than France, Italy and Spain, 
even though this also depends on the specific issues being negotiated. 
This remark also partly addresses a potential methodological pitfall of this research: 
the role played by ‘belief systems’ (or regulatory paradigms) would have more 
explanatory power if there were instances in which ideas and interests suggested 
different choices to policy makers, with the ideational component carrying more 
weight in the policy process. Yet, precisely because regulatory paradigms and market 
configuration mutually affect each other it is not possible to find clear instances in 
which these two factors pointed in opposite directions, which is why this paper does 
not juxtapose interests versus ideas. Both sets of factors influence the completion of 
the single market in financial services. 
The negotiations that took place between the two coalitions in the early 2000s 
resembled traditional EU bargaining based on trade offs, compromises (eg the home 
country supervisory approach for shares but not for bonds in the Prospectus directives, 
the definition of ‘liquid shares’ and ‘standard market’ size in the MiFID etc) and
constructive ambiguity (eg decision on controversial issues were postponed, in some 
case national discretion was inserted in the text etc.). Although both coalitions 
managed to influence the policy process, the very completion of the single market in 
financial services was a clear success of the Northern coalition (Mügge 2006, Bieling 
2003). Moreover, the new rules are to a considerable extent based on the belief system 
of this coalition. In the competition between these two coalitions, the Northern 
coalition by and large prevailed because of two interconnected reasons: the evolution 
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of the policy environment and a process of learning (cf Radaelli 1999 in the case of 
EU tax harmonisation), both of which altered the bargaining power of its members.
As far as changes in the policy environment are concerned, the Northern coalition was 
empowered by the introduction of single currency, which increased financial market 
integration in the EU, and by the renewed competition between the EU and US in this 
field. In this environment, the completion of the single market in financial services 
became a priority for the EU and the market-making, competition-friendly approach 
was regarded as the most successful, providing a competitive model for the EU. In 
turn, this had implication for the learning process taking place between the coalitions 
and their members, but further research is needed on this.
Conclusion
The directives passed in the early 2000s and examined in this paper were designed to 
substantially increase financial market integration in the EU. The making of these 
directives, and especially the Prospectus and the MiFID, was characterised by the 
presence, the interactions and the influence in the policy process and eventually in the 
outcomes of two competing coalitions. On the one side, there was a market-making
coalition, formed by Northern member states, their public authorities, industry, and 
many MEPs. On the other side, there was the market-shaping coalition, formed by 
Southern member states, parts of their industry and some MEPs. 
The outcomes of the negotiations were often rather ‘odd’ compromise solutions 
between the positions exposed by these two coalitions, or the issue was left open, to 
be decided later on, as ‘the devil is in the details’ as one policy-maker colourfully put 
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it (interview, Brussels, 27 March 2007). In some cases, the shortcoming of the 
compromise solutions adopted became apparent only when the directives were 
implemented. For example, the ‘simplified’ ‘European prospectus’ that was the 
objective of the Prospectus directive was not very simplified, because the directive 
was excessively convoluted. In other cases, the problem was the excessive use of 
national discretion and/or gold-plating by the national authorities.
Besides being slowed down by dissimilar (at times opposite) interests of the main 
policy-makers and stakeholders, the completion of the single market in securities was 
also rendered more complex by different (often competing) belief systems exposed by 
the main actors about securities trading regulation. Paraphrasing the title of the book 
of Story and Walters (1997): Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: 
The Battle of the Systems, financial market integration in the EU in the 21st century 
was not only the battle of the systems, it was also the battle of ideas (to be precise,
belief systems) about the regulation of securities trading and financial markets more 
generally. The literature has so far focused on the role of interests in shaping financial 
market integration, whereas this research argues that the role of ideas in the form of 
regulatory paradigms, should also be considered for a thorough explanation of the 
politics of financial services regulation in the EU.
The main lesson to be drawn for the completion of the single market is that policy-
makers and academics need to pay attention to ideas (or belief systems) as well as 
interests. Policy-makers are aware of this – in the financial services sector there are 
now several EU initiatives designed to promote the creation of a shared supervisory 
and regulatory ‘culture’ across the EU (this expression is used in many policy 
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documents, as well as being stressed in several interviews). Academics should 
endeavour to combine or integrate ideas and interests in their studies in a more 
systematic way. An adapted version of the advocacy coalition framework can be 
instrumental in doing so. It would be interesting to extend this analysis to other 
sectors of the single market. 
What are the prospects for the future? The completion of the single market in 
financial services is well under way but it is far from being completed. The coalitions 
are likely to remain active in shaping the EU market in financial services. There are 
two main open questions.  First, there is the interesting question of how the new 
member states will position themselves. Second, the financial turmoil of 2007-2008 in 
Europe and worldwide might provide some ammunition to the advocates of a more 
prescriptive, less market-friendly approach to financial services regulation.
30
References
van Apeldoorn, B. (2002), Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European 
integration, London: Routledge.
Bache, I., and Flinders, M. (eds) (2004), Multi-level Governance, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Bieling, H.-J, (2003), ‘Social forces in the making of the new European economy: the
case of financial market integration’, New Political Economy, 8, 2: 203-223.
Bouwen, P. (2004), ‘Exchanging access goods for access: a comparative study of 
business lobbying in the European Union institutions’, European Journal of Political 
Research, 43: 337-69.
Checkel, J.T. (1997), ‘International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the
Rationalist-Constructivist Divide’, European Journal of International Relations, 3, 4: 
473-495.
Ciani, D. (2006) ‘La Direttiva 2004/39/ce: un resoconto dall’interno dei difficili lavori 
preparatori’, in Lamandini M., Motti C. (eds) Scambi su merci e derivati su 
commodities, Quali prospettive?, Giuffre' editore.
Coen, D. and Thatcher, M. (2008), ‘Network governance and multi-level delegation: 
European Networks of Regulatory Agencies’, Journal of Public Policy, 28, 1: 49-71.
31
Coleman, W. and Underhill G. (1998), ‘Globalism, Regionalism, and the Emergence 
of International Securities Markets: the Case of IOSCO and EU Financial Integration’ 
in Coleman W. and Underhill G. (eds), Regionalism and Global Economic Integration: 
Europe, Asia, and the Americas, London: Routledge: 223-48.
Committee of Wise Men (2001), Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the 
Regulation of Securities Markets, Brussels.
Deutsche Bank (2002), EU financial market special, EU prospectus on the home 
straight, 16 December.
Deutsche Bank (2003), ‘The new ISD – better regulation for EU investment 
services?’, EU Financial Market Special, 25 June 2003.
De Visscher, C., Maiscocq, O., Varone, F. (2008), ‘The Lamfalussy reform in EU 
securities markets : fiduciary relationships, policy effectiveness and balance of power’, 
Journal of Public Policy, 28, 1: 19-47.
Dudley, G. and Richardson, J. (1999) 'Competing advocacy coalitions and the process 
of 'frame reflection': a longitudinal analysis of EU steel policy', Journal of European 
Public Policy, 6:2, 225 – 248.
The Economist, several issues
32
European Banking Federation (EBF), European Savings Banks Group (ESBG), the 
European Association of Cooperative Banks (EACB), European Mortgage Federation 
(EMF), European Federation of Building Societies (EFBS), European Association of 
Public Banks (EAPB), Comite europeen des assurances (CEA), Federation of 
European Stock Exchanges (FESE), Prospectus directive modified proposal, 31 July 
2002.
European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2004), 
Recommendation for Second reading  on the Council common position for adopting a 
European Parliament and Council directive on markets in financial instruments, 
Rapporteur Theresa Villiers, 25 February 2004, A5-0114/2004.
European Parliament, Committee on Economic and Monetary affairs (2002), Report 
on the proposal for a European Parliament and Council directive on the prospectus 
to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading, 
Rapporteur Christopher Huhne, A5-0072/2002, 27 February 2002.
The Financial Times, several issues
Ferran, E. (2004) Building an EU Securities market, Cambridge University press, 
Cambridge.
Ferrarini, G. and Wymeersch, E. (eds) (2006), Investor Protection in Europe, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
33
Greenwood, J. (2003), Interests representation in the European Union, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave.
Grossman, E. (2005), ‘European banking policy: between multi-level governance and 
Europeanization’ in A. Baker, D. Hudson, R. Woodward (eds) Governing Financial 
Globalisation, Routledge, London, pp. 130-146.
Grossman, E. (2006), ‘Europeanization as an interactive process: German public 
banks meet EU state aid policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 2: 325-48.
Grossman, E. (2004), ‘Bringing politics back in: rethinking the role of economic 
interest groups in European integration’, Journal of European Public policy, 11, 4: 
637-54.
Hall, P. (1993), ‘Policy Paradigm, Social Learning and the State: The Case of 
Economic Policy Making in Britain’, Comparative Politics 25: 275-296.
Hancher, L. and M. Moran (eds) (1989), Capitalism, Culture, and Economic 
Regulation, Oxford: Clarendon press.
Héritier, A. (1996), ‘The Accommodation of diversity in European policy-making: 
regulatory policy as patchwork’, Journal of European Public Policy, 3, 3: 149–67.
Hooghe, E. and Marks, G. (2001), Multi-level Governance and European Integration, 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
34
Kübler, D. (2001) 'Understanding policy change with the advocacy coalition 
framework: an application to Swiss drug policy', Journal of European Public Policy, 
8:4, 623 – 641.
Jabko, N. (2006), Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-
2005, Ithaca: Cornell University press.
Jacobsen, J.K. (1995) ‘Much ado about ideas. The cognitive factor in economic 
policy’, World Politics 47, 1: 283–310.
Josselin, D. (1997), Money politics in the new Europe: Britain, France and the single 
financial market, Basingstoke: MacMillan.
Jupille, J., Caporaso, J.A. and Checkel, J.T. (2003), ‘Integrating Institutions: 
Rationalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the Europe’, Comparative Political 
Studies 36, 1/2: 7-40.
Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl D. (2002), ‘Private Actors and the State: Internationalization 
and Changing Patterns of Governance’, Governance, 15, 1: 41–63.
Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl D. (1999), ‘How Europe Matters. Different Mechanisms of 
Europeanization,’ European Integration online Papers, 3, 7; 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-007a.htm.
35
Macartney, H. (forthcoming), 'Variegated Neo-liberalism: transnationally oriented 
fractions of capital in EU financial market integration', Review of International 
Studies, pp at proof stage.
Maes, I. (2007), Half a Century of European Financial Integration, Brussels: 
Mercatofonds.
Moran, M. (1991), The Politics of the Financial Services Revolution: The USA, UK 
and Japan, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Mügge, D. (2006), ‘Reordering the marketplace: competition politics in European 
finance’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 5: 991-1022.
Posner, E. (2005), ‘Sources of institutional change: the supranational origins of 
Europe’s new stock markets’, World Politics, 58, 1-40.
Quaglia, L. (2008a), ‘Committee Governance in the Financial Sector in the European 
Union’, Journal of European Integration, 30, 3: 565-580.
Quaglia, L. (2008b), ‘Setting the pace? Private financial interests and European 
financial market integration’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
10: 46-64.
36
Quaglia, L. (2007), ‘The Politics of Financial Service Regulation and Supervision 
Reform in the European Union’, European Journal of Political Research, 46, 2: 269-
90.
Radaelli, C. M. (1999) 'The public policy of the European Union: Whither politics of 
expertise?' , Journal of European Public Policy, 6, 5: 757-74.
Radaelli, C.M. (1999), ‘Harmful tax competition in the EU:Policy Narratives and 
Advocacy Coalitions’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37, 4: 661-82.
Radaelli, C.M. (1995) ‘The Role of Knowledge in the Policy Process’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 2 (2): 345-370.
Sabatier, P. A. (1998) ‘The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance
for Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 5, 1: 98–130.
Sabatier, P. A. and Jenkins-Smith, H.C. (eds) (1993) Policy Change and Learning. An 
Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Story, J. and I. Walter (1997), Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe: 
The Battle of the System, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Surel, Y. (2000) 'The role of cognitive and normative frames in policy-making', 
Journal of European Public Policy, 7, 4: 495 – 512.
37
Treasury Committee, House of Commons, (2006) European financial services 
regulation, London: The Stationery Office.
Underhill, G. (1997), ‘The making of the European financial area: global market 
integration and the EU single market for financial service’, in G. Underhill (ed.) The 
New World Order in International Finance, Macmillan, London.
Vogel, S. (1996), Freer Markets, more rules: regulatory reform in advanced 
industrial countries, Ithaca: Cornell University press.
Wood, D. (2005), Governing Global Banking, Aldershot: Ashgate.
